Talks at Hack.lu 2017

Photo Credit: Alexandre Dulaunoy

Talks at Hack.lu 2017

Talks, workshops and presentations will be published after the Call for Papers. Feel free to submit your presentations or researches to be part of the 2017 edition.

Keynotes

Queer Privacy & Building Consensual Systems

by Sarah Jamie Lewis

This is a talk about privacy. Unlike many talks on privacy we won’t get into state surveillance, PGP or anonymous browsing.

Instead, I’m going to tell you stories. These stories belong to real people. People trying to live their lives, find love, find comfort and find happiness in a world that, at best, pretends they don’t exist, and at worst, punishes them for existing.

These stories are from people who need privacy and security, but who are failed by our current tool, systems and communities.

Not all of these stories have happy endings, but each one shines a light that can show us how to build tools, systems and communities that are more useful, more inclusive and safer for those who are marginalized by society.

Bio: Sarah Jamie Lewis

Sarah Jamie Lewis is an independent security researcher currently living in Vancouver Canada. She has a passion for privacy & anonymity and runs Mascherari Press, an organization dedicated to conducting & promoting privacy research aimed at empowering marginalized & at risk communities.

Infosec and failure

by 杏👼Ąż

The speaker failed to give a proper abstract (as usual).

Bio: 杏👼Ąż

Reverse engineer - author of Corkami.com, Github.

Information Flows and Leaks in Social Media

by Vladimir Kropotov and Fyodor Yarochkin

Covfefe or not covfefe? The social network is a very powerful tool of influence in modern world. Is your opinion really yours? With this presentation we examine a number of social events and the impact they had on social media platforms. We try to understand the dynamics of information dissemination through a social network and demonstrate how these networks are frequently abused by all sorts of malfactors to pursue an agenda of their interest. Our findings are presented in form of several case studies where we walk through series of major events and analyze how these events were played online. Different regional groups, different linguistic groups: the behavior on social media could be a pre-requisite of activity in kinetic world. Known campaigns of character assassination online were in some cases followed by physical extermination or attacks on the objects of attention. We examine such behaviours in different national context: Latin America, Russia, China, Ukraine and the Middle East and demonstrate the affiliation of these activities with other Black Market commodities and services. Further, we discuss how these services could be abused to have a major impact in physical world.

Bio: Vladimir Kropotov

Vladimir is researcher with Trend Micro FTR team. Active for over 15 years in information security projects and research, he previously built and led incident response teams at some of Fortune 500 companies, was head of Incident Response Team at Positive Technologies since 2014, and holds a masters degree in applied mathematics and information security. He participates in various projects for leading financial, industrial, and telecom companies. His main interests lie in network traffic analysis, incident response, botnet and cybercrime investigations. Vladimir regularly appears at high-profile international conferences such as FIRST, CARO, HITB, Hack.lu, PHDays, ZeroNights, POC, Hitcon, and many others.

Bio: Fyodor Yarochkin

Fyodor is a researcher with TrendMicro Taiwan as well as a Ph.D. candidate at EE, National Taiwan University. An early Snort developer, and open source evangelist as well as a “happy” programmer. Prior to that, Fyodor professional experience includes several years as a threat analyst at Armorize and over eight years as an information security analyst responding to network, security breaches and conducting remote network security assessments and network intrusion tests for the majority of regional banking, finance, semiconductor and telecommunication organisations. Fyodor is an active member of local security community and has spoken at a number of conferences regionally and globally.

Talks

On Strategy

by Eleanor Saitta

How should small development teams think about security?

Dedicated security hires often come fairly late in a startup’s life. As a consultant, I often see teams of up to fifty engineers with no security staff. Even if they’re motivated to build secure systems and consider security a collective responsibility, their understanding often doesn’t go much beyond patching boxes and one-off fixes for basic, OWASP-level issues. Even larger organizations in the 300-400 engineer range often don’t have a unified security strategy to coordinate the what security staff they do have. Lack of understanding, strategy, and coordination yields poor execution.

In this talk, I’ll go over my toolkit for working with development teams who are ready to get serious about security. Whether you’re an engineering director trying to figure out where to turn, the first security hire at a startup, or a consultant looking at it from the other side, this should help you see where to start. We’ll cover:

  • Why you want to start with some technical work but not too much
  • How to teach teams to see security in a way that enables them to manage it as a whole-systems outcome
  • The scope of work teams should be looking at
  • How to think about risk and cost usefully
  • The relationship security should have with the rest of the organization and the business
  • How to deal with security compliance and still be secure
  • How to plan for security staffing and when to work with consultants

Bio: Eleanor Saitta - @dymaxion

Eleanor Saitta is an independent security architecture and strategy consultant with media, finance, healthcare, infrastructure, and software clients across the US and Europe. She was previously the security architect for Etsy.com, and has worked for a number of commercial consultancies (Bishop Fox, IOACtive, and others) over the past fifteen years. Her work has encompassed everything from core security engineering and architecture work for Fortune 50 software firms to cross-domain security for news organizations and NGOs targeted by nation states. Her focus is on the ways task and experience design, system architecture, development process change, and operational changes can shift the balance of power between adversaries to bring better outcomes to users.

Saitta is a co-founder and developer for Trike, an open source threat modeling methodology and tool which partially automates the art of security analysis and has contributed to the Briar and Mailpile secure messaging projects. She’s on the advisory boards of the Freedom of the Press Foundation, the International Modern Media Institute, and the Calyx Institute, all organizations that look at freedom in the media and security online. Saitta is a regular speaker at industry conferences; past venues include O’Reilly Velocity, KiwiCon, ToorCon, CCC, Hack in The Box, and HOPE, among others. You can find her on twitter as @dymaxion, and at https://dymaxion.org

Intel AMT: Using & Abusing the Ghost in the Machine

by Parth Shukla

Come see how Intel AMT can be used to completely own a modern machine permanently and without detection.

In the first half of the talk, we’ll see how an attacker can abuse the legitimate functionalities of Intel AMT to gain long term persistent access with little to no chance of detection. The demoed attack can be executed to take ownership of AMT in less than 60 seconds - either through supply chain or temporary physical access. We will then show how AMT can be used for persistent access to the machine via readily available and easy-to-use C&C tools. Finally, we will cover possible mitigations and preventions against such attacks.

In the second half of the talk, we will walk through the process of doing non-destructive forensics on an Intel AMT to which we don’t know the admin password (i.e. potentially attacker controlled!). We will also describe how to reclaim ownership of the AMT once forensics is complete. Finally, we will be releasing the Linux tooling we developed in order to facilitate AMT forensics.

What is Intel AMT?

Intel AMT is an out-of-band, always-on management technology, embedded into Intel chipsets supporting vPro technology, intended to allow remote management of equipment without the need for a functioning OS. Intel AMT is commonly available on all Intel-based business laptops & desktops as well as many high end consumer laptops & desktops.

Bio: Parth Shukla

Parth Shukla is a Security Engineer and member of Google’s Infrastructure Protection team. He works on efforts related to improving firmware integrity, verification and transparency.

Prior to Google, Parth was an Information Security Analyst at the Australian Computer Emergency Response Team (AusCERT). While at AusCERT, Parth analysed the non-public data of the Carna Botnet that he obtained exclusively from the anonymous researcher of Internet Census 2012. Parth released a white paper on this analysis and presented on it at various conferences, including: DeepSec 2013 in Vienna, Austria; Blackhat Sao Paulo 2013 in Sao Paulo, Brazil; APNIC 36 in Xi’an, China and AusCERT 2013 in Gold Coast, Australia.

Countering Security Threats by Sharing Information: Emerging Civil Society Practices

by Becky Kazansky

What role does threat information sharing play in the safety and security of civil society organizations? This talk takes the audience through a case study on information sharing practices based on interviews with 20 human rights defenders dealing with a set of serious digital and physical security threats.

The case study presented in this talk explains how a network of civil society organizations focused on advancing women’s rights in a politically volatile context built up their security infrastructure by starting to share information about threats with their network of allies. The talk will walk the audience through how the network of human rights defenders began to build trust and log security incidents, and to eventually spot patterns that allowed them to put effective security countermeasures into place.

Controversially, this network of human rights defenders relied on Facebook as their platform for information sharing about threats, a fact which brings up many important questions about the merits and pitfalls of using commercial platforms, effective threat modeling, and generally, what it takes to get people to move to more secure modes of information management. This talk will show that sharing information about threats strengthened the work of this human rights network even as it exposed them to further dangers, and came at great cost in terms of time and resources. What lessons can be gleaned from their experience?

This talk aims to offer rich insights into how ’real-world’ security practices play out in organizational contexts, as made possible through the kind of ‘longitudinal’, ethnographic study done by the speaker. The case study is based on interviews, observations, and discussions taking place around the context of a digital security workshop conducted by the speaker two years ago, while working together with the Tactical Technology Collective. It is the hope of the speaker that highlighting the actual practices of people with ‘real-world’ constraints can offer the security community a chance to think about how to create systems and infrastructures that build on existing practices rather than providing ill-fitting add-ons.

Bio: Becky Kazansky

Becky Kazansky is a PhD candidate and lecturer at the University of Amsterdam, studying the development of new security infrastructures across transnational civil society networks. In the past 10 years, she has worked with a number of different civil society organizations on digital security research and capacity building, previously the Lead Programme Researcher at Tactical Technology Collective.

Digital Vengeance: Exploiting Notorious C&C Toolkits

by Waylon Grange

Every year thousands of organizations are compromised by targeted attacks. In many cases, the attacks are labeled as advanced and persistent which suggests a high level of sophistication in the attack and tools used. Many times, this title is leveraged as an excuse that the events were inevitable or irresistible as if the assailants’ skill set is well beyond what defenders are capable of. To the contrary, often these assailants are not as untouchable as many would believe.

If one looks at the many APT reports that have been released over the years some clear patterns start to emerge. A small number of Remote Administration Tools are preferred by actors and reused across multiple campaigns. Frequently sited tools include Gh0st RAT, Plug-X, and XtremeRAT among others. Upon examination, the command and control components of these notorious RATs are riddled with vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities that can be exploited to turn the tables from hunter to hunted.

Although the material in this talk will provide tools for launching an offensive against attackers this talk is not intended to be instructional for hacking back. The ethics and legality of counter attacks will be touched on only briefly as that is a discussion beyond the scope of this talk.

The presentation will disclose several exploits that could allow remote execution or remote information disclosure on computers running these well-known C&C components. It should serve as a warning to those actors who utilize such tool sets. That is to say, such actors live in glass houses and should stop throwing stones.

Bio Waylon Grange

Waylon Grange is an experienced reverse engineer, developer, and digital forensics examiner. He holds a graduate degree in Information Security from Johns Hopkins University, and has worked numerous computer incident investigations spanning the globe. He currently works as a Senior Threat Researcher for Symantec and previously worked for the Department of Defense performing vulnerability research, software development, and Computer Network Operations.

Keynterceptor: Press any key to continue

by Niels van Dijkhuizen

The past decade has taught us that there are quite some attacks vectors on USB. These vary from hardware key-logging to driver fuzzing and from power surge injection to network traffic re-routing. In addition to addressing these issues, the security community has also tried to fix some of these. Several defensive hard- and software tools focus on a particular piece of the puzzle. However none, is able to completely mitigate the risks that involves the everyday use of USB in our lives.

Key stroke injectors like Rubber Ducky and MalDuino have a big disadvantage: they are not very stealthy. When no protection is in place, there is a big change the end-user will notice something fishy is going on. Proper USB Class filtering policies and a daemon that monitors typing speed will put this kind of attacks to a halt. To bypass both the user’s attention and current security mechanisms, I have developed Keynterceptor. This is a proof of concept keyboard implant that is able to capture and inject keystrokes and communicate over the air via a back-channel while keeping the local time.

Since Keynterceptor is made up from very affordable, off-the-shelf electronic parts, it is likely that such an attack tool can be created and used by someone with few resources.

I will demonstrate the effectiveness of Keynterceptor in a real-world scenario where an end-point gets compromised.

Bio: Niels van Dijkhuizen

Niels is a lead analyst at the CSIRT of a large organization in the Netherlands. He is a profound advocate of open standards and open-source software and conducts information security research in his spare time. Niels previously built monitoring and incident handling teams and performed network intrusion tests at current and previous jobs. He holds a bachelor’s degree in embedded systems and a master’s degree in computer science. His main interests lie in anomaly detection, hardware hacking and traffic anonymisation.

A view into ALPC-RPC

by Clement Rouault and Thomas Imbert

The Advanced Local Procedure Call (ALPC) is an Inter-Process Communication method widely used in recent Windows version. One important application of the ALPC is to perform Remote Procedure Call (RPC) on the local computer. Whereas ALPC have been scrutinized by security researcher in the last few years, its usage in the MS-RPC have been less documented.

This presentation will explain what are the core structures & API of ALPC then explore how RPC-over-ALPC works. Furthermore we will describe how we searched for vulnerabilities using a full-Python implementation of a simple RPC client soon to be released. Lastly, an UAC bypass and a Local Privilege Escalation found during our research will be presented.

Bio: Clement Rouault - @hakril

Clement Rouault is a security researcher currently working at Sogeti ESEC R&D. Fervent user of Python he is interested in use, abuse and implementation of this language. His research interests include reverse engineering, exploitation and windows internals.

Bio: Thomas Imbert - @masthoon

Thomas Imbert works at Sogeti ESEC R&D as a security researcher. His interests are focused on reverse engineering, virtualization, forensics, vulnerability research and exploitation. On his free time, he likes to participate to security competitions with the khack40 team.

How I’ve Broken Every Threat Intel Platform I’ve Ever Had (And Settled on MISP)

by John Bambenek

Almost every major enterprise has the same problem, how to categorize, store, and operationalize the various sources of intelligence (internal and external) so that they can be useful. The way we categorize information and operationalize information, however, has led to design flaws of almost every intel platform out there. IP address lists are good for plugging into firewalls, but they don’t appear organically in the absence of other critical information like hostnames, file names, TLS certificates, and so on.

To perform proper intelligence, all of these items need to be correlated into common events so discrete data points can be mapped to larger events and to overall patterns and campaigns against an organization.

This talk covers the adventures of working with various platforms to store a large malware configuration database so that it can retain its usefulness to users to correlate attacks back to specific actors. This malware configuration database (called Barncat) ultimately sits on MISP after attempting other platforms that failed to work for this use case. The intent of this talk is to shift the paradigm from indicators to events as the starting element to begin threat intelligence work as the relationship of all the observables of an attack are important to retain, analyze, and correlate.

Bio: John Bambenek

John Bambenek is Manager of Threat Systems at Fidelis Cybersecurity and an incident handler with the Internet Storm Center. He has been engaged in security for 18 years researching security threats. He is a published author of several articles, book chapters and one book. He has contributed to IT security courses and certification exams covering such subjects as penetration testing, reverse engineering malware, forensics, and network security. He has participated in many incident investigations spanning the globe including the DNC breach and other election related cybersecurity incidents affecting both parties. He also produces several large intelligence datasets based on DGAs and malware configurations that are given away for free. He speaks at conferences around the world and runs several private intelligence groups focusing on takedowns and disruption of criminal entities.

Let’s Play with WinDBG & .NET

by Paul Rascagneres

.NET is an increasingly important component of the Microsoft ecosystem providing a shared framework. Many Microsoft tools, such as PowerShell, rely on the .NET platform for their functionality. Obviously, this makes .NET an enticing language for malware developers too. Hence, malware researchers must also be familiar with the language and have the necessary skills to analyse malicious software that runs on the platform. During the presentation, I will explain how to automate .NET analysis with WinDBG the Microsoft debugger. To illustrate my talk, I will show how to analyse PowerShell scripts with WinDBG and how to automatically unpack a .NET packer family discovered recently. The presentation includes several live demo on WinDBG usage in this specific context.

Bio: Paul Rascagneres

Paul is a security researcher within Talos, Cisco’s threat intelligence and research organization. As a researcher, he performs investigations to identify new threats and presents his findings as publications and at international security conferences throughout the world. He has been involved in security research for 7 years, mainly focusing on malware analysis, malware hunting and more specially on Advanced Persistence Threat campaigns and rootkit capabilities. He previously worked for several incident response team within the private and public sectors.

Sigma - Generic Signatures for Log Events

by Thomas Patzke

Log files are a great resource for hunting threats and analysis of incidents. Unfortunately, there is no standardized signature format like YARA for files or Snort signatures for network traffic. This makes sharing of log signatures by security researchers and software developers problematic. Further, most SIEM systems have their own query language, which makes signature distribution in large heterogeneous environments inefficient and increases costs for replacement of SIEM solutions.

Sigma tries to fill these gaps by providing a YAML-based format for log signatures, an open repository of signatures and an extensible tool that converts Sigma signatures into different query languages. Rules and tools were released as open source and are actively developed. This presentation gives an overview about use cases, Sigma rules and the conversion tool, the development community and future plans of the project.

Bio: Thomas Patzke

Thomas Patzke has more than 10 years of experience in the area of information security and currently works at thyssenkrupp CERT. His main job is the discovery of vulnerabilities in applications and products, but he also enjoys working on defensive topics, especially in the area of threat hunting. Thomas likes to create and contribute to open source security tools like Sigma, EQUEL, an ELK configuration for Linux systems, a POODLE exploit and various plugins for the Burp Suite (github.com/thomaspatzke).

He does not have a single certification and is quite proud of it.

Malicious use of Microsoft “Local Administrator Password Solution”

by Maxime Clementz & Antoine Goichot

“Local Administrator Password Solution”, known as LAPS, provides management of local account passwords of domain joined computers. Passwords are stored in Active Directory (AD) and protected by ACL, so only eligible users can read it or request its reset.

We started some security research on this solution and managed to get illegitimate access to local administrator credentials (and to control the generation of a new administrator password) in a post-exploitation scenario (to maintain presence on a compromised computer). Moreover, depending on the method used to deploy LAPS, we also elaborated a privilege escalation scenario.

Both scenarios will be demonstrated on stage, we will explain the inner working of LAPS and our exchanges with the Microsoft Security Response Center.

Bio: Maxime Clementz & Antoine Goichot

Maxime @maxime_tz and Antoine @AntoineGoichot joined the Cyber Security Advisory team at PwC Luxembourg in 2012 and 2015, respectively. Their favourite assignments are penetration tests and information security advisory. When they have the occasion to perform vulnerability research or Security R&D, they are always delighted to present their results (Hack.lu 2012, 2015 and now 2017!).

Device sensors meet the web - a story of sadness and regret

by Lukasz Olejnik

The web is becoming increasingly rich in features as more powerful APIs are introduced and implemented by browsers. Among the new features are communication channels such as Web Bluetooth as well as access to device sensors (light, proximity, magnetic field, etc.) allowing access to information about users and their surroundings. New web features offer increased functionality and novel use patterns, but also increase the risk of abuses. In this talk we will discuss and demonstrate the privacy risks associated with exposing sensors to the web and how sensors could be abused by malicious websites. We’ll show the risk of abusing of seemingly innocuous sensor information; we’ll describe how Battery Status API enabled tracking and information leaks, and show how to steal web browsing history using the ambient light sensor. At the end we will take a step back and highlight the need to consider security and privacy during the drafting of new standards, as well as discuss how to improve the big picture for web users.

Bio: Lukasz Olejnik - @lukOlejnik

Lukasz Olejnik is a security and privacy researcher and advisor. He specializes in web security and privacy, privacy engineering, privacy reviews and privacy impact assessments. He has industry, research and technology policy experience, and he contributes to privacy reviews of web standards as a W3C Invited Expert.

Lukasz completed his Ph.D. at INRIA (Grenoble, France).He worked at Poznan Supercomputing and Networking Center, CERN and University College London. His interests include information, computer security and privacy, especially web, mobile and Internet of Things and Web of Things security and privacy. He has experience in privacy reviews and privacy impact assessments and he helps organizations with their privacy strategy. He is working on the ePrivacy regulation at the European Parliament as a technology policy advisor.

He can also be found on his site.

The Bicho: An Advanced Car Backdoor Maker

by Sheila Ayelen Berta and Claudio Caracciolo

Attacks targeting connected cars have already been presented in several conferences, as well as different tools to spy on CAN buses. However, there have been only a few attempts to create something similar to a useful backdoor for the CAN bus. Moreover, some of those proofs of concept were built upon Bluetooth technology, limiting the attack range and therefore tampering its effects.

Those things are old! Throughout our research we have successfully developed a hardware backdoor for the CAN bus, called “The Bicho”. Its powerful capabilities render it a very smart backdoor. Have you ever imagined the possibility of your car being automatically attacked based on its GPS coordinates, its current speed or any other set of parameters? The Bicho makes it all possible.

All the “magic” is in the assembler-coded firmware we developed for a PIC18F2685 microcontroller. Additionally our hardware backdoor has an intuitive graphical interface, called “Car Backdoor Maker”, which is open-sourced and allows payload customization. The Bicho supports multiple attack payloads and it can be used against any vehicle that supports CAN, without limitations regarding manufacturer or model. Each one of the payloads is associated to a command that can be delivered via SMS, allowing remote execution from any geographical point.

Furthermore, as an advanced feature, the attack payload can be configured to be automatically executed once the victim’s vehicle is proximate to a given GPS location. The execution can also be triggered by detecting the transmission of a particular CAN frame, which can be associated with the speed of the vehicle, its fuel level, and some other factors, providing the means to design highly sophisticated attacks and execute them remotely.

Bio: Sheila Ayelen Berta - @UnaPibaGeek

Sheila A. Berta is an Information Security Specialist and Developer, who has begun at 12 years old by herself. At the age of 15, she wrote hers first book about Web Hacking, published by RedUSERS Editorial at different countries. Over the years, Sheila has discovered several vulnerabilities in popular web applications such as Facebook, LinkedIN, Hotmail, ImageShack and others.

Actually, Sheila works at Eleven Paths as Security Researcher which is specialized in web application security, malware analysis and exploit writing. She is also a developer in ASM x86, AutoIT, C/C++, Python and the most popular web application technologies. Additionally, Sheila is Security Researcher at UdeMM University, where she works leading projects about technology and cybersecurity.

Sheila is an International Speaker, who has spoken about different researches at important security conferences such as Black Hat USA 2017 & EU 2016 Arsenal, DefCon 25 CHV, Ekoparty Security Conference, OWASP Latam Tour, APPSEC Latam, DragonJARCon and others.

Bio: Claudio Caracciolo - @holesec

  • Actual Chief Security Ambassador at Eleven Paths.
  • Local chapter coordinator at Centro de Ciberseguridad Industrial of Argentina (a Centro de Ciberseguridad Industrial de España Subsidiary - CCI-Es.org)
  • Former President at ISSA Argentina (through periods 2011-2013 and 2013-2015)
  • Information Security specialist consultant - Professor of “Computer Forensics” and “Information Security” classes at Instituto Superior de Seguridad Pública (ISSP)
  • Active member of several information security associations such as: ISSA International, OWASP, Usuaria, Argentina Cibersegura
  • Member of Segurinfo’s academic committee from 2007 to date
  • Guest speaker at several international information security conferences and events such Black Hat USA 2017 Arsenal, DefCon 25 CHV, Ekoparty Security Conference and others.
  • Instructor on Ethical Hacking related issues such as: Defense Methodologies, Platform Hardening, Web Security, and Anti-Forensic Techniques.
  • Social Engineering Passionate.
  • Co-author of “Ethical Hacking, un enfoque metodológico” (Editorial Alfaomega - 2010).
  • Co-organizer of MS Doing Blue event.

Are your VoLTE and VoWiFi calls secure?

by Sreepriya Chalakkal

Voice over LTE (VoLTE) as well as Voice over WiFi (VoWiFi) are variants of Voice over IP that makes use of IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) in its backend. In this talk, we identify five different attacks on VoLTE/VoWiFi.

This includes mainly (i)sniffing VoLTE/VoWiFi interfaces, (ii)extracting IPSec keys from IP Multimedia Services Identity Module (ISIM) that is embedded within the SIM card, and (iii)performing three different kinds of injection attacks in Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) headers that are used for signaling of VoLTE/VoWiFi. As a result of VoLTE/VoWiFi sniffing, we identified information disclosures such as leaking IMSI, IMEI, location of users and private IP of IMS.

We also managed to extract the ciphering key and the integrity key (CK/IK) used for IPSec from ISIM with the help of a hardware device called SIMTrace.

We also discuss three different SIP header injection attacks that enables location manipulation and side channel attacks.

It is important to note here that all these attacks are valid on the current 3GPP standards that are used by telecom providers. Thus understanding the attacks and mitigating them is of high relevance.

This is a continuation of the work presented by Schmidt et.al in the talk IMSecure – Attacking VoLTE at Areas41 conference, 2016. There is also a reference paper for more information

Bio: Sreepriya Chalakkal

Sreepriya works at ERNW GmbH as a security researcher focused on telecommunication security.

These days, she spends her time playing with telecommunication devices and SIM cards. Sreepriya likes to do security analysis of large code bases, packet captures and logs. She completed her masters from Technical University of Berlin and University of Trento with a dual degree in Computer Security and Privacy in March 2017. She is inspired by the mission “Making the world a safer place” and loves to work towards fulfilling that goal.

Snuffleupagus - Killing bugclasses in PHP 7, virtual-patching the rest

by Sébastien (blotus) Blot, Thibault (buixor) Koechlin & Julien (jvoisin) Voisin

Suhosin is a great PHP module, but unfortunately, it’s getting old, new ways have been found to compromise PHP applications, and some aren’t working anymore; and it doesn’t play well with the shiny new PHP 7. As a secure web-hosting company, we needed a reliable and future-proof solution to address the flow of new vulnerabilities that are published every day. This is why we developed Snuffleupagus, a new (and open-source!) PHP security module, that provides several features that we needed: passively killing several PHP-specific bug classes, but also implementing virtual-patching at the PHP level, allowing to patch vulnerabilities in a precise, false-positive-free, ultra-low overhead way, without even touching the applications’ code.

Bio: Sébastien (blotus) Blot, Thibault (buixor) Koechlin, Julien (jvoisin) Voisin

  • Sébastien (blotus) Blot is a pretty cool guy.
  • Thibault (bui) Koechlin used to write exploits for fun, he’s now CISO at NBS System, writing the naxsi WAF to prevent web pwning.
  • Julien (jvoisin) Voisin used to pwn and reverse stuff while contributing to radare2, he nowadays focus on protecting web stuff while keeping his own bug alive on websec.fr and writing stuff on dustri.org. He’s also running some high-speed Tor relay.

SMT Solvers in the IT Security - deobfuscating binary code with logic

by Thaís Moreira Hamasaki

Malware is sneaky. Malicious codes are implemented to stay hidden during the infection and operation, preventing their removal and the analysis of the code. Most samples employ some sort of packing or obfuscation techniques in order to thwart analysis. Similar techniques are also used to protect digital assets from intellectual property theft.

Analysis tools help getting new insights that can be used to secure software and hardware by identifying vulnerabilities and issues before they cause harm downstream. Tools and techniques beyond standard debuggers can enhance analysts capabilities with better adaptability and automation.

This talk will give you a small taste on some practical applications of SMT solvers in IT security, investigating the theoretical limitations and practical solutions, focusing on their use as a tool for binary static analysis and code deobfuscation.

Bio: Thaís Moreira Hamasaki

Thaís Moreira Hamasaki is an independent malware researcher focussing on static analysis, reverse engineering and logical programming. Thaís started her career within the anti-virus industry working on data and malware analysis, where she developed her knowledge on threat protection systems. She won the “best rookie speaker” award from BSides London for her first talk about “Using SMT solvers to deobfuscate malware binaries”. Recent research topics include malware binary code deobfuscation, generic unpacking and malware analysis automation. She is an active member of the Düsseldorf Hackerspace, where she also leads the groups for Reverse Engineering and x86 Assembly. In her free time, you can find Thaís building tools, cooking or climbing somewhere offline.

Hacking the Warrant: A workshop on LEA CNE

by Scarlet Kim & Éireann Leverett

Hacking by law enforcement is on the rise, in criminal cases. What would an ideal warrant look like in such cases? What would it allow, and what would it prevent? Who would oversee it? Could cryptographic technologies be employed to limit overuse of exploits? Or to trace the use of them years afterwards? How does all this intersect with disclosure debates?

CNE by law enforcement is in use around the world, this workshop proposes to discuss that with some real world examples, and write counterfactuals of how they would have worked with different oversight, and judicial review. Until every juror is a technologist, hackers will need to contribute to legal processes in order to produce sensible educated stakeholders in judicial processes.

Scarlet is a seasoned lawyer, and Eireann is an unreasonable hacker. Together, they seek to bring together law enforcement and computer offence and defence teams, to identify how this could all work in a multi stakeholder, multi jurisdictional world.

Bio: Scarlet Kim

Scarlet Kim is a Legal Officer at Privacy International, a London-based human rights NGO focused on issues arising at the intersection of privacy and technology. Scarlet is involved in litigating cases concerning government hacking, bulk interception, intelligence sharing, and freedom of information in the courts of the U.S., the U.K. and Europe. Scarlet previously worked as an Associate Legal Adviser at the International Criminal Court and as a Gruber Fellow in Global Justice at the New York Civil Liberties Union. Scarlet received her J.D. from Yale Law School and her B.A. from Yale University. She is a U.S.-qualified lawyer and is admitted as a Solicitor in England and Wales.

Bio: Éireann Leverett

Éireann Leverett was an Open Web Fellow with Privacy International 2016-2017 and continues to enjoy collaborating with talented lawyers working on hacking problems.

What is the max Reflected Distributed Denial of Service (rDDoS) potential of IPv4?

by Éireann Leverett & Aaron Kaplan

Sounds crazy to even try to estimate right?

This presentation will cover the details of the calculation, and how we can track these numbers over time. We will also do some visualisation of this data and initiate discussion of where our resources should be spent best in fighting the threat of rDDoS attacks. The key contribution is an extensible methodology for measuring global potential for rDDoS attacks, in realistic terms of throughput. Why might this matter to DDoS mitigation, and what can we learn by watching these trends over time?

Bio: Éireann Leverett

Éireann Leverett hates writing bios in the third person. He once placed second in an Eireann Leverett impersonation contest. He likes teaching the basics, and learning the obscure. He is sometimes jealous of his own moustache for being more famous than he is. If he could sum up his life in one sentence; he wouldn’t. That would be a life-sentence! He is primarily known for smashing the myth of the air-gap in industrial systems with his master’s thesis, and Switches Get Stitches. He believes security takes an awful lot more than penetration-testing and speaks often about the wider effects of embedded system insecurity. Lately he works on security economics matters for cyber insurance with his own company Concinnity Risks.

Bio Aaron Kaplan

Aaron Kaplan works at CERT.at and is on the board of FIRST.org He likes global perspectives on the Internet since he believes this is a common space for all of us. Outdated devices on the ‘net == pollution.

With Eireann he shares quite a few interests starting from data science, asking smart questions to each other and of course the resentment of writing one’s own bio in the third person.

Network Automation is not your Safe Haven: Protocol Analysis and Vulnerabilities of Autonomic Network

by Omar Eissa

Autonomic systems are smart systems which do not need any human management or intervention. Cisco is one of the first companies to deploy the technology in which the routers are just “Plug and Play” with no need for configuration. All that is needed is 5 commands to build fully automated network. It is already supported in pretty much all of the recent software images for enterprise level and carrier grade routers/switches.

This is the bright side of the technology. On the other hand, the configuration is hidden and the interfaces are inaccessible. The protocol is proprietary and there is no mechanism to know what is running within your network.

In this talk, we will have a quick overview on Cisco’s Autonomic main components, then I will reverse-engineer the proprietary protocol through its multiple phases. Finally, multiple vulnerabilities will be presented, one of which allows to crash systems remotely by knowing their IPv6 address.

Bio: Omar Eissa

Omar Eissa is a security Analyst working for ERNW. His interests are network security and reverse- engineering. He is a professional Cisco engineer with various years of experience in enterprise and ISPs networks. He has given talks and workshops at various conferences like Troopers17, Black Hat US and Def Con.

Hospitals and infosec (the consequences of bad security in health care)

by Jelena Milosevic

Hospitals can be attractive places for hackers. With access to critical medical records and personally identifiable information, there is great opportunity to exploit patients. Health care workers are very busy and, more often than not, there is not a lot of interest in computer security. Privacy and the protection of computer records sometimes gets put on the back burner, and caring for the devices used in hospitals is an after-thought, meaning that computers and other devices are not updated in a timely manner and are prone to vulnerabilities.

I see vulnerabilities on all levels and in all roles and locations in the hospital – in software, devices, and with humans. The consequences of bad security are huge and can cause harm both to the patient and to employees. Criminal behaviour can go unnoticed for long periods. Without proper security controls patient records can be manipulated. You can imagine the consequences; they can happen. Security needs to be built from the ground up so that employees understand the risks at all levels and can do all they can to protect the patient. We must build awareness programmes and develop processes and procedures that are possible to follow, thereby creating a higher level of security to ensure that our patients are not in danger.

This presentation will expose the risks and vulnerabilities in hospitals and aims to start driving the discussion and generation of ideas for procedures to avoid the dangerous pitfalls that put lives in peril. My goal is to ensure that we create a safe and secure environment for our patients and employees.

Bio: Jelena Milosevic

A pediatrician and ICU nurse with a lot of experience, working at many different hospitals in the Netherlands. Over the past 3 years active in the infosec community and applying the knowledge of infosec into the healthcare world to improve the security of the environment for patients and the medical staff. A member of the I Am The Cavalry group and a part of the network of Women in Cyber.

In Soviet Russia, Vulnerability Finds You

by Inbar Raz

Many times, security researchers pick a subject or a field, and then go hunting for interesting stuff. And let’s face it - in lack of real Security-by-Design policies and adequate security practices, pretty much every stone you’ll turn will reveal something under it.

But sometimes, interesting things just run into you while you’re going about your business. Something just appears before your eyes, begging for your attention.

The stories in this talk are all about research that started because I ran into something and it caught my attention - I wasn’t looking for it. From Web Automation, through Loyalty Card fraud, Bots on Tinder and Airport Security fails, I just stumbled into all of them. Some allow you to steal PII, some allow you to steal money, and some allow you to steal, well, an airport.

Clarification: While the presentation is named after the famous meme, none of the cases actually happened in Russia.

Bio: Inbar Raz

nbar has been teaching and lecturing about Internet Security and Reverse Engineering for nearly as long as he has been doing that himself. He started programming at the age of 9 on his Dragon 64. At 13 he got a PC, and promptly started Reverse Engineering at the age of 14. Through high-school he was a key figure in the Israeli BBS scene. He spent most of his career in the Internet and Data Security field, and the only reason he’s not in jail right now is because he chose the right side of the law at an earlier age.

Inbar specializes in outside-the-box approach to analyzing security and finding vulnerabilities. Using his extensive experience of over 20 years in the Internet and Data security fields, he spent 3 years at Check Point, running the Malware and Security Research, and 2 years at PerimeterX, performing fascinating research on Bots and Automated Attacks and educating both customers and the public about the subjects.

Inbar has presented at a number of conferences, including Defcon, Kaspersky SAS, Hack.lu, CCC, Virus Bulletin, ZeroNights, ShowMeCon, several Law Enforcement events and Check Point events.

Front door Nightmares. When smart is not secure

by ObiWan666

I will present a closer look onto electro-mechanic door locks, so called “digital cylinders”. In my talk, I will mainly not speak about the RFID hacking part. This has already been done by many other and will be only a small topic, including what kind of tools to use, comparison chart of different RFID transponders, etc. I will talk more about the electro-mechanic design of the locks and where to attack these. We will learn, how these locks are working in general and I show different techniques used by different vendors. After the overview, we will dig deeper into the mechanical and electronic details of the locks. I will then show where the weaknesses of the design are, and, how to open the locks without a valid RFID Transponder. The audience will learn how they can identify good and bad locks. Even a “not so secure” lock can work in environments where no classified information is stored.

Bio: ObiWan666 - @ObiWan666

Security Evangelist and Firefighter. 48 Years old. Security enthusiast since decades Interested in hardware hacking, forensic, car security and always want to know, how things work.

ObiWan666 is a 48 year old electronic technician, who works in the oil and gas industry since more than 17 years. Before that, he joined the german army for more than 6 years as Navigation electronic expert for Helicopters. During this time, he was in several missions across the world. Electronic and mechanical background is his force to look from both sides on security. And last but not least, he his a volunteer firefighter more than 30 Years. He knows to be “under fire”.

WTFrance ?! Cryptography and legislation in France

by Okhin

France is known for its lack of respect of politicians, cheese, wine andbaguette. It is less known for its fight against Privacy and Cryptography, especially those last years and during the state of emergency.

And, even if you’re not French, you should care, because french representatives in european parliament are leading the fight against Privacy and Cyptography.

This talk will go through the laws which restrict access to information and cryptography, and how some of them failed spectacularly, detail the new government and their position regarding mathematics and what is the impact of those representatives on the European Union.

Bio: Okhin

TODO

Randori, a low interaction honeypot with a vengeance

by Bouke Ban Baethem

Randori is an opensource honeypot built behind existing services. The author will discuss its conception and first results. Based on these results he will suggest a different model for thinking about and dealing with global botnet infections: one that is not based on the idea of cyber warfare, but cyber disease control.

Bio: Bouke Ban Baethem

Fittingly equipped with a history degree, Bouke set out ten-odd years ago as an ethical hacker. Recently he saw the light and joined the blue team, where he enjoys solving incidents, building tools and chanting “Shit’s on fire, yo”.

API design for cryptography

by Frank Denis

It was a Monday morning in the office and, as usual, everyone was busy sorting through their mail before starting work.

Still in a daze, Frank innocently and aimlessly typed these words in the Google search box: “how to encrypt stuff”. As he kept reading, his blood pressure kept increasing. And what happened next remains unclear to this day.

Frank will share his story of recovery with the audience. Why he cried in despair at first, how he cried even more later, and his slow path to recovery. He will talk about NaCl, libsodium, and about the paste (sic), present, and future state of cryptographic libraries, with an emphasis on their mesmerizing APIs.

Finally, he will not announce the public availability of a new, related, open-source project.

Bio: Frank Denis

Frank is a carbon-based living organism, frequently observed in Paris, France.

When he’s not slacking off on Twitter, he offers his expertise in malware analysis, distributed systems, application security and digital image processing to companies of all sizes.

He’s also a long-time opensource enthusiast and contributor, with an emphasis on security-oriented projects.

Automation Attacks at Scale

by Will Glazier & Mayank Dhiman

Automation attacks are currently plaguing organizations in industries ranging from financial and retail, to gaming and entertainment. These attacks exploit stolen credential leaks, black market & custom attack toolkits, and massively scalable infrastructure to launch widely distributed attacks that are extremely difficult to detect, let alone attribute. In this presentation we will inform the audience of the scale of this problem, discuss a detection methodology to counter these attacks, and walk through 3 real-world examples of how attackers created and monetized the distributed infrastructure they require to launch these attacks.

Bio: Will Glazier

Will Glazier serves as Stealth Security’s Threat Intelligence Analyst & Architect. His primary interests include understanding attacker infrastructure responsible for malicious automation attacks, including account takeover. His current focus is on building out a threat intelligence database with indicators relevant to the problem of malicious automation, by tracking the use of leaked credentials, shared attacker infrastructure, and black market attack toolkits. His previous experience includes a stint at Fireeye. He holds a BA in International Relations & Economics from Tufts University.

Bio: Mayank Dhiman

Mayank Dhiman serves as Stealth Security’s Principal Security Researcher. His primary interests include solving problems related to online fraud and internet abuse. His current focus lies in detecting and mitigating malicious automation attacks. Previously, he had worked on fraud and abuse related solutions at Facebook and PayPal. He is the co-author of a number of research papers and book chapters and his work has been presented at USENIX HotSec, NDSS USEC, APWG eCrime and RSA. He holds a MS in Computer Science from UC San Diego.

Workshops

Reverse Engineering a (M)MORPG

by Antonin Beaujeant

This workshop will cover the basics of reverse engineering a (M)MORPG. The target will be Pwn Adventure 3, a MMORPG developed by Vector35 for the Ghost in the Shellcode 2015 CTF. Despite being old and intentionally vulnerable, the technique and methodology used should not differ from reality. We will first have a closer look at the network communication between the client and the game server and dissect the custom binary protocol used. For this, the instructor will explain a methodology that consist of isolating data, analyse the changes and raise assumptions. Once the protocol partly reversed, we will build a Wireshark parser (dissector) in order to start analysing the protocol itself. For further tests, we will create an asynchronous proxy for intercepting the network traffic in order to successfully modify and/or inject packets. In the next part of the workshop, we will reverse engineer the client/server logic in order to highlight “secrets” to finish a few quests and identify vulnerabilities in the game. We will also patch the binary to become a Superman (running faster, jumping higher). Finally, we will hook the DLL in order to hack the game “on the fly”.

Bio: Antonin Beaujeant - @beaujeant

Antonin Beaujeant @beaujeant is a professional penetration tester and researcher. His primary focus is web app and network penetration test but he also enjoy spending time on hardware, reverse and CTF in general.

Hacking workshop mobile devices

by Frank Spierings

Bio: Frank Spierings

Malware Triage Workshop - Malscripts Are The New Exploit Kit

by Sean Wilson and Sergei Frankoff

Traditionally malware triage has focused on exploit kits which were the initial infection vector of choice, but this is changing. In recent years malscripts and file based exploits have become an equally common initial infection vector. Often delivered via email, malscripts can take many different forms, WScript, Javascript, or embedded macros. However, the goal is always the same; obtain code execution and deliver a malicious payload.

In this workshop you will work through the triage of a live malscript sample. During this process you will identify and extract malscripts from Office documents, manually deobfuscate the malscripts, circumvent anti-analysis techniques, and finally determine the purpose of the scripts and payload in order to develop countermeasures.

This workshop is aimed at junior incident responders, hobby malware analysts, and general security or IT practitioners. If you have a good understanding of scripting languages like VBScript, and Javascript, and you are familiar with windows internals you should have no problem completing the workshop. We request that you come prepare with a laptop that you are able to use to analyze malware. We strongly recommend installing a Virtual Machine. If you would like to install a temporary Windows 10 virtual machine you can obtain a free copy. We also recommend you have Python 2.7 installed on your laptop, you can obtain a copy.

Bio: Sean Wilson

Sean is a co-founder of Open Analysis, and volunteers as a malware researcher. He splits his time between reverse engineering malware and building automation tools for incident response. He is an active contributor to open source security tools focused on incident response and analysis. Sean brings over a decade of experience working in a number of incident response and application security roles with a focus on security testing and threat modelling.

Bio: Sergei Frankoff

Sergei is a co-founder of Open Analysis, and volunteers as a malware researcher. When he is not reverse engineering malware Sergei is focused on building automation tools for malware analysis. Sergei is a strong believer in taking an open, community approach to combating cyber crime. He actively contributes to open source tools and tries to publish as much analysis as possible. With almost a decade of experience Sergei has held roles both, as the manager of an incident response team, and as a malware researcher.

Getting the Most Out of Windows Event Logs

by David Szili

A typical mistake repeatedly made by many security teams is that they collect such large amount of events that at the end, their Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) solution chokes on the data fed into it, rendering it slow and ineffective. “Collect all the events!!!” sounds nice in theory, but in practice, less is often more and we must select and focus on events that provide real value from a security perspective and have an actual use-case behind them. But what if we do not even have a SIEM and cannot afford one or do not have the staff or the skill to deploy and maintain one? Luckily, in a Microsoft Windows environment we have built-in and free tools at our disposal to get quickly started with security monitoring and hunting using Windows Event Logs.

In this workshop, we will go through some of the most important and valuable Windows Events to be collected such as AppLocker or EMET events, user and service creation events, PowerShell commands, etc. We will discuss how to properly configure Advanced Audit Policy Settings, see how to collect events with Windows Event Forwarding (WEF) and how to set up Sysmon for advanced application and process monitoring.

Once we have the list of events we need, we will see a few simple PowerShell commands and modules that can help us slice and dice Event Logs like Get-WinEvent. We will also test scripts and tools that are made for monitoring and detection, such as DeepBlueCLI. Finally, we will use the free Power BI Desktop to build nice dashboards to give us a better overview of the data we are collecting.

Bio: David Szili

David Szili is the CTO of Alzette Information Security with penetration testing, security monitoring and incident response background, previously working for companies like POST Telecom PSF, Dimension Data, Deloitte and Balabit.

David has two Master’s degrees in Computer Engineering and in Networks and Telecommunication and a Bachelor’s degree in Electrical Engineering. He also holds several IT security certifications such as GSEC, GCED, GCIA, GCIH, GMON, GNFA, GMOB, OSCP, OSWP and CEH.

In his spare time, David likes working on hobby electronics projects, develop new IT security tools or sharpen his skills with CTFs and bug bounty programs.

SAP Pentest - From outside to company salaries tampering

by Yvan Genuer

SAP is boring, too big or too complicated? What about learning SAP Security during a fun CTF workshop? Additionally we’ll provide you with a pre-configured attacker VM with all tools required to perform workshop activities. Attendees learn how to work against different SAP Systems targets with different configuration issues in a ‘realistic’ environment. Few slides, lots of practice - this is the leitmotiv of this guided SAP pentest workshop.

Bio: Yvan Genuer

Yvan has near than 15 years of experience in SAP. Starting out as a SAP basis administrator for various well-known French companies, since 5 years, he focuses on SAP Security and is now the head of SAP assessment and pentesting at Devoteam security team. Although being a very discreet person, he received official acknowledgements from SAP AG for vulnerabilities he’s reported. Furthermore, he is a longtime member of the Grehack conference organization and has conducted a SAP pentest workshop at Clusir 2017, as well as a full training at Hack In Paris 2017.

Mobile Security workshop

by Frank Spierings & Arthur Donkers

This workshop takes students on a tour of testing the security of mobile applications. Loosely following the OWASP mobile security testing guide (MSTG) students learn how to find vulnerabilities in mobile applications, circumvent rooting/jailbreak detection and break certificate pinning. Knowing these techniques enables students to manipulate the traffic between applications and backend systems, play around with local files and inject their own code into the applications.

During the workshop, we focus on both static analyses (decompilation of APK files, manipulate SMALI and disassembling iOS code) and dynamic analysis (tampering with the runtime behavior of applications).

We make extensive use of the Frida toolkit for runtime injection, overloading and hooking applications. This toolkit works both on iOS and Android and offers a great interface for mobile application testers.

Special attention is given to injecting Frida into applications on a non-rooted or non-jailbroken device. Due to advances in both Android and iOS, it will get harder to break the security on a device and install your own framework.

Students are encouraged to bring their own laptop with an up-to-date Android SDK and a (rooted) device so they can do the hands-on exercises on their own. Students may bring their iOS devices with an up-to-date XCode and a valid developer certificate, but the focus will be on Android (due to availability). We will demo some of the stuff on IOS.

Bio: Arthur Donkers

Arthur Donkers lives in the beautiful northern part of the Netherlands and started his career as an electrical engineer building his first computer from scratch. And then Linux happened, which was a great platform for learning and building things. Using Linux he started doing security scans and penetration testing for a lot of different clients, on all sorts of infrastructure and platforms. Using his experience from infrastructure and application testing, he started focussing on the mobile platform, both iOS and Android. In the early days, testing was relatively easy as these devices could be rooted and jailbroken without any great effort. Nowadays he teams up with Frank to find ways to test mobile applications without the need to jailbreak or root it first. They both found a friend in Frida for this.

Bio: Frank Spierings

I am Frank Spierings. I have been a computer nerd since the age of 10. I’ve worked in different area’s in the IT industry. In the last couple of years I’ve transitioned from building infrastructure to the computer security game. I’ve always enjoyed solving hackig challenges, so it is a nice improvement to do this for a living. Arthur Donkers got me interested in mobile application security about a year ago. Since then, I’ve been playing around with Frida. I find it a lot of fun to be able to manipulate program flow using a fairly easy to use hooking mechanism.

When I am not playing these kind of computer games, I enjoy other technical stuff like kick boxing and brazillian jiu-jitsu, as well as listening to tecnhical death metal.

ManaTI: Web Assistance for the Threat Analyst, supported by Domain Similarity. Talk and Workshop

by Raúl B. Netto

The increasing diversity and amount of malware traffic is pushing researchers to find better detection methods. When security analysts analyze such large amount of traffic, they are overwhelmed and therefore they analyze less traffic with less accuracy.

Among the most used characteristics for finding threats in a network is the analysis of HTTP traffic. The default unit of analysis is usually called weblog, from a log for the web traffic. Security analysts usually use these weblogs to detect threats from infected computers in their internal networks.

To find threats it is needed a complex expert knowledge that ranges from looking for domains which have being reported as malicious, to analyzing the patterns in the URLs and using the WHOIS information of the domains. Although these techniques may work for the average analysis, they highly depend on the humans generating the reputation rules and on the malware being analyzed. All in all, analyzing millions of weblogs with speed and accuracy, balancing the amount of information and finding threats is at least a daunting task. Security analysts need a tool to help them organize their work, and a machine learning algorithm that can improve the detection and speed up the analysis.

It is in this context that we researched and created a new tool to assist the network security analysts to find threats: the ManaTI project. It has two main goals: First to assist the analysts, be means of a web interface, in evaluating the network traffic to better find and process the network information. Second, to create a machine learning method that can identify domains which WHOIS Information is related. Our algorithm can work as a WHOIS classification of similar domains or as a WHOIS similarity distance.

Our WHOIS Distance Algorithm (WDA) works by first extracting the WHOIS data from the two domains to be compared, then generating eight features from the comparison of both sets, and finally training and applying a linear model to obtain the final distance. WDA can compute the distance between any type of domains. To make our labelled dataset for training and testing, we use normal domains of well known companies, such as Facebook, Apple and Oracle. We obtained the malicious domains from projects as: DNH-BH[1], Ransomware Tracker[2] and the Stratosphere IPS Project[3]. The WDA can help analysts to find similar domains based on their knowledge of other normal or malicious domains.

ManaTI was developed using the Django web framework for Python. It has several tools that improve the efficiency and accuracy of the analysts, such as: a dynamic table to visualize weblogs, bulk labeling of weblogs, the possibility to get and show information from VirusTotal or online WHOIS databases, the function to relate domains using the WHOIS distance algorithm explained before and a large number of features to evaluate the performance of the analyst. ManaTI is highly scalable and modular, allowing the analysts to create their own Python scripts using the API provided by the system.

Bio: Raúl Benítez Netto - @HoneyJack

Hi there. I am working with computers since the age of 12. I have been working as Web Developer during 4 years, and then I decided to move from my native Paraguay to the Czech Republic. Nowadays, I am trying to create web applications and help security researchers in their analysis of malware behavior in the network. I am passionate about cyber-security and machine learning. Master student in the Czech Technical University in Prague

I am working in the startup SingleCase.cz as a web-mobile developer and in the lab of Stratosphere IDS Project in AIC. In Stratosphere lab, we are researching about machine learning and computer security to help NGO and companies with their cyber-security incidents.

Besides, I am interested in hacking stuff like Rubber Ducky USB or small projects with Raspberry Pi or Omega2. Lover of books, especially of classic writers’ books, backpacker when my time allows it to me and an amateur photographer. Stay in touch! @Piuliss